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Australia has endured a turbulent term on the Security Council since 
January 2013, navigating crises ranging from Syria and Ukraine to South 
Sudan and Mali. Its UN team has gained a good reputation for 
pragmatism and openness among fellow diplomats, UN officials and 
NGOs. Australia’s main achievement has been to carve out a diplomatic 
niche on humanitarian aid to Syria. It has also shown a talent for tactical 
brinksmanship in facing down an increasingly assertive Russia while 
also distinguishing itself from the United States, UK and France in UN 
debates. 
While admired for its competence, Australia has only been able to have 
relatively limited influence on situations – ranging from Afghanistan to 
Mali – on which bigger powers have greater say at the United Nations. 
But Australia’s advocacy for human rights, humanitarian causes and 
more effective sanctions has had a positive impact on both the Council 
and attitudes to Australia across the United Nations. 
 





In March 2008 then prime minister Kevin Rudd announced that Australia 
would seek a non-permanent seat on the Security Council. Critics 
immediately rounded upon the decision as a waste of taxpayers’ money. 
Australia would fail in its bid. Even if it succeeded, they predicted, 
Australia would fail to have any major impact on the Council’s 
deliberations.  
But Australia did win its seat on the Council and had a chance to 
measure itself against the United Nations’ main powers. On Friday 21 
February 2014, Vladimir Putin handed Canberra a foreign policy victory. 
With violence peaking in Kiev, the Russian president convened his top 
security advisers to discuss the events in Ukraine. But his team also 
needed to respond to events at the United Nations, where diplomats had 
spent weeks negotiating a Security Council resolution sponsored by 
Australia, Luxembourg and Jordan calling for “safe, rapid and 
unhindered” access for humanitarian assistance to the victims of the 
Syrian war. 
The draft resolution represented the culmination of almost a year of 
dogged diplomacy by Australian officials and their Luxembourger 
counterparts. It included surprisingly detailed descriptions of the Syrian 
regime’s atrocities, including the use of crude barrel-bombs. Russia’s 
ambassador to the United Nations, Vitaly Churkin, had indicated that the 
text was acceptable. But Churkin had sent similar signals in earlier talks 
on Syria before changing tack on orders from Moscow, vetoing three 
resolutions in conjunction with China in 2011 and 2012. Western 
diplomats were optimistic but not absolutely certain that Putin and his 
advisers would not sink the latest text. 
Moscow let it go through. On 22 February, the Council unanimously 
adopted Resolution 2139, “expressing grave alarm” at the humanitarian 
disaster in Syria. Few observers believed that it would transform the war, 
but at least the Council now looked a little more humane. Australia and 
its co-sponsors earned praise for navigating the rifts between the 
permanent five (P5) members of Council. Britain, France and the United 
States gave the resolution strong support in its final stages, but Russia 
and China might have rejected the text if it had been tabled by London, 
Paris or Washington. Nor was this the first time Australia had played a 
pivotal role in diplomacy over Syria: Canberra’s Permanent 
Representative to the United Nations, Ambassador Gary Quinlan, had 
chaired the Council in September 2013 during the crisis unleashed by 
the Syrian military’s use of chemical weapons in Ghouta.  
Yet the February resolution also highlighted the limits of what Australia – 
or any non-permanent member – can achieve in the Security Council. 
Despite its firm wording, it boiled down to a call for the Syrian 
combatants to respect basic international humanitarian law. UN 
Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon welcomed the resolution but 




complained “it should not have been necessary.”1 In May, Ban told the 
Council that the Syrian government was still “failing in its responsibility to 
look after its own people” and called for a new strategy to get aid to 
rebel-held areas.2 
The brief moment of cooperation over Resolution 2139 was also the 
prologue to clashes at the United Nations over Ukraine, which soon cast 
a pall over Syrian diplomacy. In mid-May, Russia and China vetoed a 
new resolution, tabled by France and co-sponsored by fifty-seven 
countries including Australia, calling for the International Criminal Court 
(ICC) to investigate Syria. As this paper reached completion in late May, 
Australian diplomats were talking to their Luxembourger and Jordanian 
counterparts and other allies about tabling a potentially explosive new 
resolution penalising Damascus for its failure to let aid reach the 
suffering. 
Having joined the Security Council in 2013 for the first time since the 
1980s, when the body was mired in Cold War battles, Australia has 
found itself in the middle of a fresh bout of big-power confrontation. How 
have its representatives in New York navigated through these 
treacherous waters? This Analysis explores the principles and priorities 
that have guided their efforts in the Council to date. It draws on a broad 
range of informal interviews with UN officials, diplomats and activists 
who have worked with Australia’s UN mission since January 2013.3 It 
gives a sense of the – mainly positive – way these efforts are seen in the 
UN system. It examines the Syrian case and parallel crises in Africa as 
key tests of UN diplomacy, before offering an overall assessment of 
Australia’s tenure. 
 
FROM THE “INTERNATIONAL INTEREST” TO REAL 
DIPLOMACY 
Australian diplomats were under no illusions about the state of the 
Security Council as they finished their campaign for a temporary seat in 
late 2012. Prime Minister Rudd launched the campaign in more benign 
circumstances in 2008 before the Georgian war and the global financial 
crisis signalled the fragile state of international affairs. His pitch, like his 
interest in climate change, contained an obvious streak of cosmopolitan 
idealism. Later in 2008 he told the UN General Assembly that “our 
national interests are invariably best served by the simultaneous 
prosecution of the international interest.”4 In the years that followed – as 
Rudd’s domestic fortunes waned, waxed and waned again – it has been 
hard to keep faith in the “international interest” as climate change 
diplomacy has faltered, Russia and China have grown more assertive, 
and the United States has equivocated over its global role. 
 




This sense of drift has been prevalent in the Security Council. As the 
Australian campaign approached its conclusion, the Council split over 
the Libyan and Syrian wars, while simultaneously struggling to control 
African crises including the fragmentation of Mali and militia warfare in 
the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). By late 2012, with China and 
Russia still unwilling to compromise over Syria, the Council faced a 
gathering tide of discontent among the wider UN membership.  
When Julia Gillard addressed the United Nations in September 2012, 
shortly before the Security Council elections for 2013-2014 seats, she 
insisted that Australia still stood for “high ideals”.5 Australia’s advocacy 
for the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), which came close to completion in 
2012 and would finally be agreed in April 2013, buttressed this claim. Its 
high-powered Security Council campaign climaxed in a decisive first-
round win ahead of Luxembourg and Finland. Observers across the 
United Nations cite the personal popularity of Ambassador Quinlan as an 
asset both during the campaign and since, although the investment of at 
least A$25 million in outreach efforts certainly helped too.6 
But doubts lurked about Australia’s ability to act on its ideals in the 
Security Council. While only faintly aware of Australian politics, other 
countries’ representatives at the United Nations were conscious that 
Labor was liable to lose to the Coalition in 2013, and that the new 
administration was likely to have less internationalist inclinations. Some 
Western diplomats muttered that the Australian team, so confident 
during the campaign, seemed cautious (or according to one especially 
unkind observer, “floundering”) as Labor infighting and electioneering 
intensified.  
Australian diplomats had more immediate reasons for caution. Having 
seen the Council split over Syria and stumble over Africa, they knew that 
they would find few easy openings for diplomatic initiatives. Even the 
most ambitious non-permanent members of the Council have to tread 
carefully, as the P5 are quick to punish any challenges to their 
predominance. In recent years major powers including Brazil and India 
have passed through the Council without leaving any substantial legacy. 
The Brazilians stumbled in an effort to engage Iran on its nuclear 
program in 2010, while India wasted political capital in a push for a 
permanent Council seat in 2011. 
For Australia, the obvious point of reference was Germany, a non-
permanent Council member in 2011 and 2012. The Germans had 
stumbled too, clumsily abstaining on the March 2011 resolution 
authorising the use of force in Libya. But under the guidance of a popular 
ambassador, Peter Wittig, they had regained their credibility relatively 
quickly, taking a strong line over Syria and sticking close to the British, 
French and Americans. Australia seemed poised to take up the 
Germans’ mantle as the most senior pro-Western non-permanent 
member of the Council.  
 




More specifically, Australian officials aimed to take over a number of 
positions that the Germans had held within the Council, including the 
role of ‘pen-holder’ (diplomatic coordinator) on Afghanistan and the 
chairmanship of sanctions committees dealing with al-Qaeda and the 
Taliban. These were not givens: the P5 were interested in the Afghan file 
given the need to plan for the country after the exit of the International 
Security Assistance Force (ISAF) at the end of 2014. Russia pushed to 
take over as pen-holder, but Australia managed to deflect its bid. It also 
secured the chairmanship of the Iran sanctions committee, a further 
sensitive post that Germany had not held. 
UN officials generally judge Australia to have done a good job on these 
initial priorities. It has had limited leverage over Afghan affairs, as 
tensions between Washington and Kabul have obstructed debates about 
the future international presence in the country. These have also 
complicated discussions of the United Nations’ own assistance mission 
in Afghanistan (UNAMA) which, although a target for terrorist attacks, 
may have greater responsibilities once ISAF is gone. When UNAMA’s 
mandate came up for renewal in March 2014, the United States 
signalled it was not yet willing to discuss substantive changes, quashing 
serious debate.  
Sanctions diplomacy has provided more room for creativity. Many non-
permanent Council members dread the minutiae of sanctions regimes, 
leaving serious business to the P5 or UN officials. The Australian 
mission set up a special unit to handle these issues and signalled that 
overhauling the implementation of sanctions would be one of its 
signature issues. Australian negotiators have a reputation among other 
Council members for expertise and dedication, sometimes bordering on 
an obsession with process. They have promoted transparency over the 
activities of the sanctions committees they manage – for example by 
reaching out to West African diplomats to discuss measures against al-
Qaeda in the Sahel – and tried to share lessons with other committee 
chairs.   
In May, Australia launched a “high-level review of United Nations 
sanctions” with Finland, Greece and Sweden with the ambitious if 
tortuous mission statement “to enhance their effectiveness and thereby 
better address threats to international peace and security through 
improved integration with today’s evolved network of internal and 
external institutions and related legal instruments.”7 The focus is sharper 
than this language implies. Most new UN sanctions are now targeted at 
individual wrongdoers (such as Taliban and al-Qaeda leaders) rather 
than states, and implementing them requires complex financial and legal 
arrangements. Australia grasped an unglamorous task in trying to 
improve sanctions implementation, but it is crucial to the United Nations’ 
use of economic tools in future crises.  
 
 




Such technical innovations have not resolved deeper political frictions 
over the application of sanctions. In June 2013, Ambassador Quinlan 
had to delay a regular 90-day report from the Iran committee due to 
divisions between China, Russia and the West. He eventually released a 
report outlining the differences between the two sides (largely relating to 
Iranian missile tests in 2012) rather than searching for an impossible 
consensus. Nonetheless, Australia’s efforts to promote openness over 
sanctions have been a part of a broader strategy to raise the Security 
Council’s transparency. 
‘Transparency’ is not the diplomatic pabulum that it might sound like. 
Always an exclusive club, the P5 have notably increased their grip on 
the Council in recent years, conducting most essential negotiations in 
private.8 This sidelines the non-permanent members and alienates 
states outside the Council. In mid-2012 an alliance of small states led by 
Switzerland launched a General Assembly resolution demanding greater 
openness, but the P5 put aside their Syrian differences to crush the 
initiative. As Australia joined the Council, the transparency advocates 
were still recovering from that fight. 
Despite the risks of offending the P5, Australia soon emerged as an 
advocate of transparency within the Council. It worked well with the 
“Accountability, Coherence and Transparency” (ACT) Group, a coalition 
of states formed in May 2013 to restart the fight for a more open Council 
after the 2012 debacle. A diplomat from one of the leading ACT 
members describes Australia as an “excellent” partner.  
Such warm words about Australia are not uncommon. Asked to assess 
the Australian team at the United Nations, the various UN-watchers 
interviewed for this paper use terms such as hardworking, well-informed, 
collegial and (most frequently of all) pragmatic. The “international 
interest” has not been entirely forgotten, either. Human rights advocates 
concur that Australian diplomats are consistently open to their opinions. 
“They don’t always agree with our ideas,” one concludes, “but they do at 
least consider them properly.”  
Contrasting the Australians with their German predecessors, members 
of the press corps grumble that the Germans gave better background 
briefings. (Australia, says one, has not learned to “negotiate through the 
media”.) But those who have worked with the two countries’ officials on 
similar topics behind the scenes say the Australians are usually as 
skilled as, or even better than, their German counterparts.  
This level of competence was tested when Kevin Rudd called a federal 
election for September 2013 – clashing with Australia’s tenure as 
president of the Council that month. The September Council presidency 
is usually a diplomatic dream, as it coincides with the annual gathering of 
world leaders for the opening of the UN General Assembly. For 
Quinlan’s team it had the makings of a nightmare, overlapping with the 
(predictable) transfer of power in Canberra and the (unforeseen) 




chemical weapons crisis in Syria. With the Council teetering on the edge 
of a destabilising breakdown over Syria – to which we will return in the 
next section – Australian diplomats had to manage their domestic 
political headaches. 
They did so surprisingly well. The Australian mission had spent some 
time looking for a suitable topic for a top-level debate in the Council, at 
first considering women, peace, and security. It eventually settled on the 
control of small arms and light weapons, a security threat that the 
Council had only addressed sporadically in the past and could be linked 
to Australia’s role in sealing the ATT. The UN diplomatic community 
expected that whoever was prime minister in Canberra after the 
elections would come to chair the meeting.9 Yet after defeating Labor, 
Tony Abbott decided to send his newly minted foreign minister Julie 
Bishop to New York instead.  
To make matters worse, Russia (which had refused to support the ATT 
and has a thriving small-arms export sector) threatened to upset the 
debate by raising questions about Western and Arab governments’ 
shipments of weapons to the Syrian rebels. Despite the continued 
uncertainty over Syria, Australia decided to put Russia on the spot by 
tabling a lengthy if mainly declaratory resolution boosting arms 
embargoes, disarmament programs and other measures to limit small 
arms. Russia chose to abstain rather than veto, allowing Bishop to chair 
a successful Council meeting and showing that Australia was willing to 
tangle with a P5 member.  
 
SYRIA: NICHE DIPLOMACY IN A TOTAL WAR 
If states’ tenures on the Security Council were defined by serious and 
sustained diplomacy, Australia could be a superpower. But this is not 
how the United Nations works. Realpolitik and brinksmanship continue to 
determine power and status in the Security Council. As Germany’s self-
defeating decision to abstain on the military action in Libya showed, a 
competent non-permanent member can be undone by bad crisis 
management. The hardest tests for Australia at the United Nations since 
January 2013 have thus lain in Syria and a series of complex but vicious 
crises facing the Council in the Sahel and Central Africa.  
As of January 2013, there was no guarantee that Australia would play a 
noteworthy role in Security Council diplomacy over Syria – or indeed that 
the Council as a whole would continue to play any real role on the 
worsening conflict. China and Russia’s three vetoes of previous Security 
Council resolutions hung heavily over UN discussions of the crisis. In 
early January, President Bashar Assad firmly rebuffed ceasefire 
proposals from UN-Arab League envoy Lakhdar Brahimi. In the same 
month Australia joined fifty-seven other countries, including Britain and 




France, in signing a letter coordinated by Switzerland calling for the 
Security Council to refer Syria to the International Criminal Court. But 
China and Russia had no interest, and the United States believed the 
gambit was counterproductive. 
By April 2013, Brahimi was close to resigning, but the new US Secretary 
of State John Kerry persuaded him to stay by promising to convene a 
peace conference in Geneva with Russia. The humanitarian crisis in 
Syria and its neighbourhood was, however, worsening. In April 2013, the 
United Nations’ main humanitarian officials made a fresh push to 
publicise the cataclysm, complaining in The New York Times of “an 
insufficient sense of urgency among the governments and parties that 
could put a stop to the cruelty and carnage in Syria.”10  
After the UN officials briefed the Council, Ambassador Quinlan pushed 
for his divided counterparts to at least agree on “press elements” on the 
crisis, offering to draft the necessary language.11 If this was the weakest 
possible option available short of silence – not even amounting to a full 
press release – it was possible to hash out talking points on reducing the 
“unacceptable” violence.  
Luxembourg had independently started exploring the problem, and 
agreed to join forces to pursue a resolution on humanitarian access. 
Overcoming a series of obstacles the non-permanent duo aimed for a 
Security Council “presidential statement” on humanitarian access – a 
less potent outcome than a resolution but still significant in UN terms. 
Had the Syrian war continued uninterrupted, Australia and Luxembourg 
would probably have got agreement on this statement eventually. But 
the Syrian security forces’ use of chemical weapons at Ghouta near 
Damascus on 21 August totally transformed the terms of debate. 
Ghouta threatened to wreck Council diplomacy. Russia torpedoed a 
draft British resolution authorising a military response. President Obama 
declared that he would not let “diplomatic hocus-pocus” at the United 
Nations stop strikes against Damascus. By 1 September, when Quinlan 
took up the rotating presidency of the Council, it looked probable that 
Australia would oversee the worst smash-up in its history since Iraq.  
In the weeks that followed, the United States and Russia groped their 
way out of the crisis, effectively cutting all other Council members 
(including Britain, France and China) out of negotiations. Australia had 
little leverage over substance, but Quinlan did have power over process 
as Council president. His strategy appears to have been to avoid any 
actions or debate at the United Nations that could upset Washington and 
Moscow while reassuring fellow Council members that a solution 
remained possible. He avoided convening formal talks on the crisis in 
early September but used a scheduled discussion on the Middle East as 
a chance for all sides to state their concerns. This restraint annoyed 
ambassadors who wanted a more prominent role, but a high-profile 




debate on the crisis could have caused all sides to harden their 
positions, lowering the chances of a compromise.  
Quinlan’s gamble paid off in the last days of September, when the 
United States and Russia presented their agreement on a UN-mandated 
process to dismantle Syria’s chemical arsenal in tandem with the 
Organisation for the Prevention of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). Quinlan 
smoothed the deal’s path, liaising with individual Council members to 
ensure that they would not propose disruptive amendments while 
handling the formalities of collaboration with the process-heavy OPCW. 
Viewers around the world watched TV footage of Quinlan gaveling 
through Security Council Resolution 2118 on 27 September.  
While critics accused the United States and United Nations of selling out 
the Syrian people, Australia had a further card up its sleeve, tabling the 
presidential statement on humanitarian access it had developed with 
Luxembourg immediately afterwards. This detailed, if non-binding, 
catalogue of steps needed to facilitate aid was finally agreed on 2 
October. 
Australia thus played an instrumental role in guiding the Security Council 
through an existential crisis. Whatever disgruntlement he may have 
caused through his cautious approach, Quinlan’s performance won high 
marks among his peers. He was lucky: had the Obama administration 
decided to bomb Syria, Australia could have done little and the Security 
Council would have looked irrelevant. But a less adept diplomat would 
not have been able to navigate through this brinksmanship. 
One sour note was the failure of the 2 October statement to make any 
real impact on humanitarian aid to Syria. Attacks on the Council soon 
started to mount anew. Having won a Council seat in November, Saudi 
Arabia refused to take it, citing the forum’s maladroit performance in the 
Middle East. At the beginning of 2014, Australia and Luxembourg began 
new efforts to secure a resolution on humanitarian aid to Syria, bringing 
Jordan (which had filled the Saudi slot) in as an Arab ally in the initiative. 
Working closely with the United Nations’ Office for the Coordination for 
Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) the trio of powers worked on a text with the 
Americans, British and French through January 2014. The United States 
initially appeared disinclined to back anything that could disrupt the UN-
OPCW mission, but the evidence of a further decline in the humanitarian 
situation was overwhelming. Australia and Luxembourg reportedly 
floated a text with China and Russia on 6 February. The two non-
Western powers refused to engage in formal consultations, and Russia 
was dismissive of the entire process, but China signalled a desire to 
make a deal possible. 
 




This glimmer of an opportunity encouraged the British and French to 
invest more in the process. The United Kingdom appeared keen to take 
it over completely, arguing that Russia was vulnerable to pressure during 
the Sochi Winter Olympics. The United States concurred, and while the 
world divided its attention between skiing in Sochi and the killings in 
Kiev, the Council edged towards its agreement on Syria. Australia and 
its partners did not let go of the process despite the pressure to do so, 
and Russia finally yielded to Resolution 2139. 
There are several explanations for this success. The importance of the 
Olympics may have been overstated, but China’s openness to a deal put 
Russia in a vulnerable spot. Perhaps most importantly, the escalating 
crisis in Ukraine gave Moscow a new focus. Analysts still differ over 
whether Russia’s takeover of Crimea was planned or improvised, but 
either way Vladimir Putin did not need a peripheral fight over Syria. Even 
so, Australia and Luxembourg pulled off a difficult victory for two 
temporary Council members, and their resolution called for Ban Ki-moon 
to report monthly on humanitarian access in Syria, potentially paving the 
way for a future showdown with Damascus. Since then, as we noted at 
the outset, relations with Russia and China over Syria have deteriorated 
again.   
The February 2014 opening for better collaboration may have been 
fleeting – and given the fallout from Ukraine, the hopes it raised were 
deceptive – but Australia and Luxembourg deserve credit for persevering 
with the humanitarian file and making the best of the few tactical 
opportunities that came their way. 
 
CRISIS MANAGEMENT IN AFRICA – BUT NOT ASIA 
While tending to Syria, Australia also had to confront African crises that 
clustered on the Security Council’s agenda in 2013 and early 2014. 
These included the war in Mali, persistent instability in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC), the collapse of order in Central African 
Republic (CAR) and South Sudan’s descent into civil war. Australian 
officials had known that African crises would occupy sixty to eighty per 
cent of the Council’s agenda, and bulked up their limited diplomatic 
presence on the continent. They had also used their Security Council 
campaign to emphasise their experience of peacekeeping in cases such 
as Timor-Leste and Solomon Islands, and its potential relevance to long-
running blue-helmet operations like that in the DRC. Yet the explosions 
in Mali and the frankly obscure CAR stretched Australia’s ability to 
analyse and respond to events. 
UN officials appreciated Australia’s support for proposals for a new 
peace enforcement brigade in the DRC in early 2013. This ran into 
opposition from other non-permanent Council members such as 




Pakistan, the biggest troop contributor to blue-helmet operations, but has 
proved to be a success to date. Quinlan and his team were ahead of the 
curve on CAR, expressing alarm months before France (the former 
colonial power) decided to intervene. Australia also insisted that the 
United Nations should launch a Commission of Inquiry into events in 
CAR and provide public human-rights reporting on the situation there, in 
line with its broader commitment to transparency. With a small number 
of personnel in South Sudan, it also provided airlift after the Security 
Council authorised 6,000 reinforcements for the UN mission there on 
Christmas Eve 2013. Australian diplomats pride themselves on 
collaborating closely with their African counterparts over each crisis and 
ensuring that issues such as humanitarian access and the protection of 
civilians – similar themes to those they have raised over Syria – were 
factored into Council discussions of these conflicts. 
In doing so, they were only able to finesse strategies constructed by 
more influential players such as France. This is still more than most non-
African Council members (and indeed some smaller recent African 
Council members such as Togo) have been able to achieve. The fact 
that Australia chose to invest in activities in a part of the world that is far 
removed from where its core national interests lay may have a positive 
effect on perceptions of its Council tenure. 
Yet it also points to a major dilemma for Australia in the Security Council: 
the forum has so far been largely irrelevant to its own interests in the 
Asia–Pacific. The last UN peacekeepers left Timor-Leste in December 
2012. China and the United States negotiated a surprisingly strong 
resolution in response to North Korea’s January 2013 nuclear test, but 
Australia and other temporary Council members (including South Korea) 
had little influence over the talks.  
Australia did play a more active role in April 2014, when it joined France 
and the United States in sponsoring a Council meeting on North Korean 
human rights abuses, following on from a Commission of Inquiry chaired 
by former Australia High Court justice Michael Kirby, and raising the 
possibility of a referral to the ICC. China and Russia boycotted this 
meeting, and it is unlikely that Australia would have backed it without US 
diplomatic cover. The meeting still fit well with the broader Australian 
narrative of promoting human rights and humanitarian issues through the 
Council. 
While tensions over the South China Sea and the Senkaku/Diaoyu 
islands seized international attention through 2013, the Security Council 
did not engage on these disputes. Beijing’s veto power has precluded 
serious UN diplomacy over these issues and the United States has not 
wanted to put them before the Security Council. So while Australia has 
used its time on the Security Council to expand its role in the Middle East 
and Africa, it has not exploited the forum to advance its own regional 
interests. This was foreseeable: Australian officials studiously avoided 




suggesting that they wanted a greater United Nations role in Asia during 
their Council campaign, for fear of alienating its neighbours. Yet the 
Security Council’s silence on the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands and South 
China Sea, like its paralysis over Ukraine, has raised questions about 
the institution’s role in an era of major-power tensions. Australia’s 
advocacy of the international interest at the United Nations looks cut off 
from national interests nearer to home. 
 
LEAVING A LEGACY 
Can Australia leave a lasting legacy from its tenure on the Security 
Council when it steps down at midnight on 31 December 2014? It should 
have delivered at least one more significant resolution by then, as the 
Council has to agree a mandate for US-led international forces in 
Afghanistan after ISAF closes. This is another potential source of friction 
with China and Russia, concerned about security in Central Asia, and 
Australia will have to work hard as the Afghan pen-holder to keep all 
sides happy. Meanwhile, the odds of a further breakthrough on Syria are 
slim at best. While it is clear that President Assad is ignoring the 
February resolution, it is highly improbable that an increasingly strident 
Russia will support any serious penalties against Damascus. At the time 
of writing in June 2014, Australia was working on a new resolution with 
Luxembourg and Jordan, making sharper demands for humanitarian 
access to Syria. It was already clear that China and Russia would block 
assertive language, and there are risks of further weakening the aid 
effort with a diplomatic fight. 
Australia will hold the Council presidency again in November, and can 
use this to solidify its legacy. It plans to convene a thematic debate on 
the role of police in UN peace operations, an increasingly significant but 
poorly understood operational field which Canberra emphasised during 
its campaign. Another area where Australia will continue to push a 
substantive policy agenda is sanctions. As we have noted, it has 
launched a review of systems for helping states implement sanctions 
regimes, and advise current and future non-permanent Council 
members on how to handle these issues. Focusing on this niche could 
provide a lasting entrée into Council discussions, rather as Switzerland’s 
advocacy for transparency gives it a privileged role in debates about the 
Council’s business.  
In a recent paper, Oxfam noted that Australia must follow up on small-
arms issues.12 Yet, as Oxfam also notes, Australia must consider how to 
cap off its work on humanitarian access in Syria as best it can. This has, 
for good or ill, been the most compelling dimension of its tenure on the 
Council, at least for the wider public. Even if progress on Syria itself is 
impossible, Ambassador Quinlan and his team could table a broad 
resolution outlining the Security Council’s overall commitments to 




facilitating humanitarian aid – whether in Syria, South Sudan or North 
Korea – and proposing steps to streamline diplomacy on these urgent 
matters. In the current climate, Russia might well veto it. China would 
probably waver, as it did over Syria in February. And even a strong, 
unanimous text would probably offer little immediate succour to those 
suffering in CAR or Homs. But having stood up for a more humane 
Security Council, Australia should not relent.  
 
CONCLUSION 
If Australia’s advocacy for human rights, humanitarian causes and basic 
decency has been a recurrent theme of its term on the Security Council, 
does it matter? As Terry Eagleton, a British literary critic, has argued in 
another context, the case for “trust, loyalty, teamwork, dialogue, 
pluralism, an acceptance of difference and a sensitivity to others . . . is 
not the most world-shaking of moral standpoints.”13 
Something similar could be said about the account of Australia’s 
performance on the Security Council. All too often, it has come down to 
doing the decent thing, whether that means making sanctions regimes 
fairer, getting basic aid to starving Syrians or arguing that crimes in CAR 
should not be forgotten. Nobody could argue that these have been 
objectionable aspirations. But given the increasingly contentious nature 
of big-power relations in the Security Council, such appeals to the better 
angels of the international community’s nature have risked appearing (at 
best) a little too earnest and (at worst) sadly too innocent. 
Yet Australia’s UN team cannot be accused of naivety. In some of the 
most dire crises of the last eighteen months, Quinlan and his staffers 
have demonstrated a distinct skill for diplomatic brinksmanship. They 
have repeatedly stood up to an assertive Russia on issues from 
Afghanistan to the small-arms trade and Syrian aid. Yet Australia has 
also distinguished itself from the Western members of the P5 through 
carving out niche diplomatic goals on its chosen humanitarian causes.   
These tactical successes are, perhaps, just as important as the “high 
ideals” that have guided Australia’s policy on the Security Council. Many 
members of the United Nations have good intentions. Rather fewer have 
the capacity and gall to act on those intentions. Australia has shown that, 
at a minimum, it has the tactical dexterity to play with the P5 at the 
United Nations. If some of its efforts, most obviously over Syria, have 
had depressingly little impact on the ground it is not Australia’s fault: it is 
a symptom of the parlous state of the United Nations and international 
cooperation in general. 
Australia has not changed the world from its non-permanent seat on the 
Security Council. This was never likely. However, it has acquitted itself 
well, bringing extra rigour and professionalism to the debates in New 
 




York and always nudging the big players in the direction of a better 
approach. In the process Australia has solidified its reputation as a good 
international citizen and a serious country. For that reason alone, 
Australia’s return to the Council can be counted a success. 
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